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condemnation, it would not and should not be admitted." The question
remains as to what constitutes a reasonable time and when is the after-
sale price affected by the condemnation. It is evident that the Pennsyl-
vania courts could easily circumvent section 705 (2) (i), if the court be-
lieved that any evidence of post-condemnation sale prices should be
excluded in determining the fair market value of the condemned property,
by excluding evidence of after sale prices on the ground that the after sale
was not made within a reasonable time of the condemnation or the con-
demnation had materially affected the sale price of the subsequently sold
property.
When the issue comes before the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania, or
any state or federal court of whether testimony concerning an after sale
price should be admitted into evidence, the better approach would be that
followed in the instant decision. Evidence of post-condmenation sale
prices should be admitted if the price paid was not materially distorted
by the comndemnation as to deprive the property sold of its compara-
bility.
Donald J. Burns
TORTS-STRICT LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE PRODUCTs-The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has adopted the Restatement 2d, Torts, Section 400,
which provides that "one who puts out as his own product a chattel
manufactured by another is subject to the same liability as though he
were its manufacturer." Strict liability now applies, not only to the
manufacturer of defective products unreasonably dangerous, but also to
distributors of such products.
Forry v. Gulf Oil Corporation, 428 Pa. 334, 237 A.2d 593 (1968).
In Forry a defective' tire was manufactured by B.F. Goodrich, distributed
43. Section 604 of the new Eminent Domain Code, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 26 § 604 (1964),
provides that any decline or increase in the fair market value caused by the general knowledge
of the imminence of the condemnation is to be disregarded in determining the fair market
value of the condemned parcel. The principle enunciated in section 604 (if the fair market
value of the property to be condemned is, prior to the date of condemnation, affected by the
imminence of the condemnation such change in the fair market value is to be disregarded)
would probably be applicable to section 705(2) (i), especially in view of such previously dis-
cussed cases as United States v. 63.04 Acres of Land, 245 F.2d 140 (2d Cir. 1957); Inter-
national Paper Company v. United States, 227 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1955) which held that
evidence of after sale prices are inadmissible if affected by the condemnation.
1. The court assumed a defect at 428 Pa. 334, 343, 237 A.2d 593, 598. Tire defects are a
major cause of accidents and most tire defects concern the tire bead-that portion of the
rubber and steel wire holding the tire to the rim. Philo, Automobile Products Liability
Litigation, 4 DUQUESNE L. REv. 181, 199 (1965).
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by Gulf Tire and Supply Company, and sold by Keller's Gulf Service. One
day after2 the sale the purchaser drove to plaintiff's service station to
remedy the new tire's tendency to "wobble." 8 Examining the tire, the
plaintiff found it unseated on the rim at one point where the tire encircles
the rim-or at the bead. After deflating the tire he proceeded to inflate
it when the tire exploded, striking the plaintiff in the face. Expert ex-
amination revealed a shortage of steel reinforcing wire in the bead."
Plaintiff instituted a trespass action against the manufacturer,' the dis-
tributor and the retailer, alleging four alternative causes of action.' The
first three causes of the complaint alleged that the negligence of each
individual defendant caused the injury; in the fourth cause of action the
joint negligence of the manufacturer and the retailer, who mounted the
tire, was alleged as the cause of the injury. At trial, Judge Kreider non-
suited the plaintiff without applying Restatement 2d, Torts, Section 402A
as adopted in Webb v. Zern.7 Section 402A states that "one who sells any
product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user ... "
is liable for any injury inflicted upon the user.
On appeal the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in a three-three decision
indicated that the distributor, Gulf Tire, would be vicariously liable under
Section 400, but affirmed the nonsuit after applying 402A 8 since
[w]hile there is evidence that this tire was defective there is
no proof or allegation that such defect alone caused this ac-
cident. On the contrary, Forry contends that the [manufactur-
ing] defect plus Keller's [retailer's] negligent conduct in
mounting the tire caused the accident and of the latter there is
a complete lack of any proof.9
In Webb the plaintiff was injured by an exploding beer keg. The major-
ity opinion by Justice Cohen adopted the Restatement 2d, Torts, Section
402A 10 for the first time" and permitted the plaintiff to amend her plead-
2. The automobile was driven approximately 25 to 30 miles at speeds up to 45 miles
per hour. See n.2 at 336 of 428 Pa. 334, and at 595 of 237 A.2d 593.
3. 428 Pa. at 335, 237 A.2d at 594.
4. 428 Pa. at 342, 237 A.2d at 598.
5. Gulf Oil Corporation was removed as a defendant by stipulation. See n.3 at 336 of
428 Pa. 334, and at 595 of 237 A.2d 593.
6. PEN. R. Civ. P. 1020(c) permits pleading in the alternative.
7. 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966).
8. See n.6 at 428 Pa. 334, and at 237 A.2d 593.
9. 428 Pa. at 343, 237 A.2d at 600.
10. The text of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965):
§ 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product and
1967-1968]
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ings. 12 However, the court did not interpret the impact of the text of 402A
to enable subsequent plaintiffs to clearly determine if they had a 402A
case. 13 Furthermore, the court in Webb never referred to any of the com-
ments of 402A as interpretive of the text of 402A. The concurring opinion
by Justice Eagen"4 hails the adoption but indicates that contributory negli-
gence or assumption of the risk would be a "complete defense" to 402A
actions.' 5 This position directly contradicts comment (n) of Section 402A
which specifically excludes contributory negligence as a defense and
infers that the comments were not adopted by the Webb majority.' 6 The
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contract relation with the seller.
11. Nineteen states accept the strict liability rule of Section 402A: Eisenbeiss v. Payne,
42 Ariz. 262, 25 P.2d 162 (1933), Vaccarezza v. Saguinetti, 71 Cal. App. 2d 687, 163 P.2d 470
(1945); Canada Dry Bottling Co. of Florida v. Shaw, 118 So. 2d 840 (Fla. App. 1960);
Heimsoth v. Falstaff Brewing Corp. 1 Ill. App. 2d 28, 116 N.E.2d 193 (1953); Anderson v.
Tyler, 223 Iowa 1033, 274 N.W. 48 (1937); Connell v. Norton Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 187
Kan. 393, 357 P.2d 804 (1960); Miller v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 70 So. 2d 409
(La. App. 1954); Manzoni v. Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 363 Mich. 235, 109 N.W.2d
918 (1961); Biedenharn Candy Co. v. Moore, 184 Miss. 721, 186 So. 628 (1939); Foley v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 215 S.W.2d 314 (Mo. App. 1948); Asher v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
172 Neb. 855, 112 N.W.2d 252 (1961); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161
A.2d 69, (1960); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81
(1963) ; Mahoney v. Shaker Square Beverages, 46 Ohio Op. 2501, 64 Ohio L. Abs. 200, 102
N.E.2d 281 (Com. P1. 1951); Ponce De Leon v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 75 F. Supp. 966
(D. Puerto Rico 1948) ; General Motors Corp. v. Dodson, 47 Tenn. App. 438, 338 S.W.2d 655
(1960); Campbell Soup Co. v. Ryan, 328 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959); Swift & Co.
v. Wells, 201 Va. 213, 110 S.E.2d 203 (1959); La Hue v. Coca-Cola Bottling Inc., 50 Wash.
2d 645, 314 P.2d 421 (1957). The following eleven jurisdictions reject 402A: Alabama Chero-
Cola Bottling Co., V. Ezzell, 22 Ala. App. 210, 114 So. 278 (1927); Great A. & P. Tea Co.
v. Gwilliams, 189 Ark. 1037, 76 S.W.2d 65 (1934); Nehi Bottling Co. v. Thomas, 236 Ky.
684, 33 S.W.2d 701 (1930); Pelletier v. Dupont, 124 Me. 269, 128 A. 186, (1925); Kennedy
v. Brockelman Bros. 334 Mass. 225, 134 N.E.2d 747 (1956); Russell v. First National Stores,
96 N.H. 471, 79 A.2d 573 (1951) ; See generally Prince v. Smith, 254 N.C. 768, 119 S.E.2d 923
(1961) ; Lombardi v. California Packing Sales Corp., 83 R.I. 51, 112 A.2d 701 (1955); White-
horn v. Nash-Finch Co., 67 S.D. 465, 293 N.W. 859 (1940); Burgess v. Sanitary Meat Market,
121 W. Va. 605, 5 S.E.2d 785 (1939); Cohan v. Associated Fur Farms, 261 Wis. 584, 53
N.W.2d 788 (1952).
12. 422 Pa. at 427.
13. "The court .. .failed to define the extent to which the doctrine is to be applied, nor
did it establish any particular refinements of the rule." 5 DUQUESNE L. REV. 215, 217 (1967).
14. 422 Pa. at 428. Justice Bell dissented on the ground that the adoption of 402A
was an abrupt break from past decisions. 422 Pa. at 428.
15. Id.
16. Mardrino v. Weco Products Co., 45 N.J. 570, 214 A.2d 18 (1966), recognizes con-
tributory negligence as a complete defense.
[Vol. 6:420
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result of such inference is that they did not become incorporated into the
strict liability law of Pennsylvania.
Ferraro v. Ford Motor Co." gave a unanimous Pennsylvania Supreme
Court through Justice Eagen its next opportunity to explain the new strict
liability law of the Commonwealth as propounded by 402A. Justice Eagan
stated that Webb never decided whether or not contributory negligence
or assumption of the risk was a complete defense to an action under
420A,18 however, "[a]fter studied consideration, it appears to us that
if the buyer knows of the defect and voluntarily and unreasonably pro-
ceeds to use the product or encounter a know danger, this should preclude
recovery and constitute a complete defense ... to strict liability. Cf.,...
Restatement 2d, Torts, § 402A, comment n (1965)."' 19 Again this indi-
cated that Webb did not adopt each of the comments to 402A. Further-
more, the Ferraro opinion, although approving assumption of the risk as
a complete defense to strict liability, left the issue of contributory negli-
gence as an additional defense to strict liability unresolved.
Subsequently 402A found its way into the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania in LaGorga v. Kroger Com-
pany,2" where the first time a federal court sitting as a Pennsylvania court
discussed the ramifications of 402A beyond the text of 402A and the
facts of the case. In LaGorga, Judge Marsh stated that the purpose of
strict liability was to reduce "the difficulty of injured victims in proving
negligence of sellers of products and shifts the risk of loss for defective
products from the ultimate user to those who put such products on the
market."" Judge Marsh went on to show that 402A covers two categories
of recovery: (1) where the defect is a result of negligent manufacturing
that makes the item unreasonably dangerous; and (2) where there is no
mistake in the design but the finished product is unreasonably dangerous
to the ordinary unknowing user. 22 Using the same reasoning, commenta-
17. 423 Pa. 324, 223 A.2d 746 (1966).
18. Id. at 327, 223 A.2d at 748.
19. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment (n) (1965) states:
Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such negligence consists
merely in a failure to discover the defect in the product, or to guard against the
possibility of its existence. On the other hand the form of contributory negligence
which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known
danger, and commonly passes under the name of assumption of risk, is a defense
under this Section as in other cases of strict liability. If the user or consumer dis-
covers the defect and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably
to make use of the product and is injured by it, he is barred from recovery.
20. 275 F. Supp. 373 (1967).
21. Id. at 376. "[P]ublic policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by
products . . . be placed upon those who market them .... and that the consumer [or user]
of such products is entitled to the maximum of protection .... " RESTATEMNT (SECOND)
OF TORTS, § 402A, comment (c) (1965).
22. Id. at 380.
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tors23 have argued that defective condition unreasonably dangerous and
perfect condition unreasonably dangerous are interchangeable in terms
of establishing a 402A prima facie case.
With this background the majority in Forry written by Justice Jones,
joined by Chief Justice Bell and concurred with by Justice Eagan in
result, referred to the comments to explain the text of 402A. The majority
stated:
Section 402A-applicable to tires (Comment d, .. .
places the burden upon the plaintiff to prove that the product
was in a defective condition when it left the hands of the seller
(Comment g . . .), [2.] applies only where the existence of the
defective condition in the product makes it unreasonably
dangerous to the user (Comment i . . .), [3.] imposes strict or
absolute liability rather than liability based on negligence
(Comment g . . .) [4.] and requires no privity of contract for
the imposition of liability so that, . . . , Goodrich, the manu-
facturer, Gulf Tire, the Wholesaler, and Keller, the retailer
and immediate vendor, would all be considered "sellers" (Com-
ment f .. .). (Emphasis added.)24
The court's reference to the comments permits three observations: first,
the court stated that 402A "applies only where the existence of the defec-
23. Note, Products Liability and Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts, 55 GEO. L.J.
286, 297 (1967) ; see, Keeton Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and the Requirement
of a Defect, 41 TEXAs L. REv. 855, 859 (1963) ; see also, Wade, Strict Tort Liability of
Manufacturer, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 14-16 (1965). Some courts use the terms interchangeably, e.g.,
Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing, 42 N.J. 177, 199 A.2d 826 (1964);
Wade, supra, argues that the terms have the same meaning; see, Products Liability: Strict
Liability in Tort, 13 A.L.R.3d 1057).
24. 428 Pa. at 340, 237 A.2d at 597. See also B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d
501 (10th Cir. 1959) (involved a defective tire); Cf. Heart v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
214 F. Supp. 817 (N.D. Ind. 1963), (concerning tire purchaser's employee). Liability under
402A has been extended by the following cases: Magee v. General Motors, 124 F. Supp. 606
(W.D. Pa. 1954) (steering gear); King v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 159 So. 2d 108 (Fla. App.
1963) (airplane); Taylerson v. American Airlines, 183 F. Supp. 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (air-
plane instrument); Jabukowski v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 193 A.2d 275 (N.J. Super.
1963) (grinding wheel); Spence v. Three Rivers Builders and Masonry Supply, Inc., 353
Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958) (cinder building blocks); Continental Copper & Steel
Industries v. E. C. "Red" Cornelius, Inc., 102 So. 2d 40 (Fla. App. 1958) (electric cable);
McQuaide v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 190 F. Supp. 252 (D. Conn. 1960) (insecticide spray) ; see
Spada v. Staufer Chemical Co., 195 F. Supp. 819 (D. Ore. 1961) (herbicide); Simpson v.
Powered Products Michigan, Inc., 24 Conn. Super. 409, 192 A.2d 555 (1963) (power golf
cart); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 899 (Cal. 1963) (combination power
tool); McBurnette v. Playground Equipment Corp., 137 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1962) (children's
playground equipment); Thomas v. Leary, 15 App. Div. 2d 438, 225 N.Y.S.2d 137 (1962)
(chair); Hoffman v. Cox, 35 Misc. 2d 102, 229 N.Y.S.2d 485 (1962) (riveting machine);
Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963) (Vermont law, water heater);
Morrow v. Caloric Appliances Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1963) (gas stove).
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tive conditions in the product makes it unreasonably dangerous to the
user." It is submitted that if this is the only application of 402A then
the unknowing user of a non-defective product that is unreasonably
dangerous is precluded from recovery.26 Second, the court stated that
402A imposes "strict or absolute liability."27 But 402A does not impose
absolute liability; the manufacturer is not liable for all injuries.28 The
liability of the manufacturer is limited to situations where the element of
"unreasonably dangerous" is present. Lastly, the court showed that
through comment (f) of 402A "Goodrich, the manufacturer, Gulf Tire,
the wholesaler, and Keller, the retailer . . . would all be considered 'sel-
lers,' ,,29 and held liable. Yet, the court felt that the adoption of Section
400 was also necessary to hold Gulf Tire liable since Gulf Tire "puts out
as . . . [its] own product a chattel manufactured by another . . "
Restatement 2d, Torts, Section 400.3o
The immediate inference from the last observation concerning Section
400 is that when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court specifically refers to
a comment, clients have no assurance that the adoption has the force of
law unless some specific section stating the same thing is also adopted.
This inference also significantly weakens the force of the court's dis-
cussion in Forry of comments (d), (g), and (i) of 402A which if not
weakened by the inference would have clarified the newly adopted and
unsettled strict liability law in Pennsylvania.
Comment (d) of Section 400 indicates that one of the reasons for
the rule is the reliance of users upon the distributors who put out another's
product as their own. From this, the court concluded if Gulf Tire showed
non-reliance, Section 400 would be inapplicable. However the reliance
principle referred to is the same rationale used for Section 402A (see
comment (c)) and in neither 400 nor 402A is non-reliance considered a
complete defense.
After discussing the precedents which were applicable in the Forry
25. Id.
26. 402A is considered by other authorities to cover both situations, supra notes 21-22.
"The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated
by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the
community as to its characteristics." RESTATEMENT (SEcoNcD) or TORTS § 402A, comment (i)
(1965).
27. 428 Pa. at 340, 237 A.2d at 597.
28. Id., See, Note, Products Liability and Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts, 55
Gao. L.J. 286, 301 (1967); Keeton, supra note 23, at 858; Wade, supra note 23 at 21; e.g.
Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168 (1964).
29. 428 Pa. at 340, 237 A.2d at 597.
30. Comment (a) of § 400, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965) defines "one who
puts out a chattel" to include lessors and donors, but under 402A donors and lessors are not
considered "sellers." To this extent 400 may be interpreted to have extended 402A's applica-
tion, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment (1) (1965).
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case, the majority stated that a "jury could have found the existence of a
defect in the tire",3 and that there was "strong circumstantial evidence
from which it could be reasonably inferred that this defect in the tire
existed when it left the hands of Goodrich. 2 The court then concluded
"that the record proof renders applicable the provisions of Section 402A,
. ., and that the doctrine of strict liability . . . would be applicable to
Goodrich, the manufacturer of this tire .... ."" The court then proceeded
to exclusively consider the fourth cause of action. The plaintiff here al-
leged that his injuries stemmed, not only from the defective condition
created by the manufacturer, but also from the negligence of Keller.
Since the plaintiff did not show that Keller was negligent, the plaintiff's
nonsuit was affirmed. It is submitted that the court ignored the alternative
form of pleading as recognized by the dissent, 4 which is good pleading
practice in strict liability cases, 5 and is permitted by Pennsylvania law. 6
It is also submitted that Forry has not only refrained from explaining the
strict liability law in Pennsylvania but has also confused its application.
Salvatore J. Cucinotta
31. 428 Pa. at 341, 237 A.2d at 598.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 334, 237 A.2d at 593.
34. Id. at 341, 237 A.2d at 598. Dissent consisted of Musmanno, O'Brien and Roberts,
35. Wrights v. Staff Jennings Inc., 241 Ore. 301, 405 P.2d 624 (1965); Green v. Clark
Equipment Co., 237 F. Supp. 427 (1965); 13 A.L.R.3d 1057, 1067-8, Emroch, Pleadings and
Proof in a Strict Products Liability Case, 1966 INsURANcE L.J. 581.
36. PENN. R. Civ. P. 1020 (c) permits pleading in the alternative.
